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Abstract 
 
North Korea is a unique regime that has not followed the ‘mono transition’ path (economic reform 
under modified one-party rule) of other surviving communist regimes (China, Vietnam, Cuba) in the 
post-Cold War era. Debates over North Korea’s unique features (reluctance in economic reform, 
absence of political modification, international troublemaking) have generated two contending 
interpretations. The mainstream interpretation attributes North Korea’s uniqueness to its regime’s 
highly rigid political system (‘monolithic leadership system’). For the alternative interpretation, 
structural pressures and political calculus have driven the monolithic regime towards economic 
reform (‘marketization from above’), making it more convergent with the ‘mono transition’ regimes, 
at least in the economic aspect. In support of the latter interpretation, this article will delve further 
into three contentious issues that represent the most common doubts about the advance of 
marketization in North Korea. First, how can the regime reconcile marketization with the interests of 
its ‘core constituencies’? Second, since ‘crony socialism’ exists, how does it influence distribution 
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and productive activity? Third, how does marketization advance in view of the persistence of 
monolithic rule? In so doing, it will show how the sources of economic reform (structural factors and 
political calculus) have enabled the marketization constraints to be overcome.  
 
North Korea’s divergence from the ‘mono transition’ pathway 
 
North Korea represents an important and puzzling case of a surviving communist 
regime that has not followed the ‘mono transition’ pathway that has enabled the 
China, Vietnam and Cuba to survive in the post-Cold War world. In contrast to ‘dual 
transition’ (democratization and economic liberalization), ‘mono transition’ is 
characterized gradual economic liberalization under continuing one-party rule. 1 
While the pace of economic transition has varied, the followers of mono transition, 
have exhibited a common sequence that began with official acquiescence with 
spontaneous marketization or ‘marketization from below’, followed by 
‘marketization from above’ in which the authorities introduced gradual supporting 
reforms (China 1980s, Vietnam 1980s-90s, Cuba 1990s-2000s). These regimes 
began with encouragement of for-profit activities (by both state and non-state agents, 
including foreign capital), measures initially designed to complement the planned 
                                            
1 Kim defines it as ‘implementation of gradual economic reform1 leaving the political system 
intact’. See I.-G. Kim, ‘North Korea in transition: phased progress in reform and prospects’, East 
Asian Review, 19 (1) (2007), pp. 99-127, at p. 107, 
http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/DEV/essays/view.asp?volume_id=48&content_id=101211&category=
G [accessed 4 January 2008] 
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economy than replace it altogether.2 The advance of marketization to a critical level 
was then accompanied by the revision of the official economic ideology. Marking 
the primacy of the market, China replaced ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ 
(1980s) with the new slogan of ‘socialist market economy’ in 1992.3 The more 
orthodox-inclined Cuban regime adopted the slogan of ‘prosperous-and sustainable 
socialism’ in 2012 to acknowledge the permanence of the market.4 
China’s stellar economic performance compared to Russia’s sluggishness touched 
off debates about the utility of authoritarianism to market transition and the nature 
of regime durability. For Brus, a noted East European political economist, China 
showed how authoritarianism enabled the market reforms to be introduced 
incrementally while Gorbachev’s deliberate weakening of the Soviet regime 
snowballed into the overthrow of communist rule itself.5 For Wintrobe, a formal 
theorist of authoritarianism, the repressive nature of China’s regime enabled it to 
perform the ‘totalitarian twist’ by overcoming the three main market reform 
problems (enterprise accountability, dual pricing and inflation). 6  Pursuing very 
                                            
2 A.Y. So and Y.-W. Chu, The Global Rise of China, Polity Press, Cambridge 2016, pp. 63-71; R.I. 
Centeno, ‘The Cuban regime after a decade of Rául Castro in power’, Mexican Law Review, 9 (2) 
(2017), pp. 99-126.   
3 J. Wu, ‘China’s transition to a market economy: how far across the river?’ in Transition from 
Socialist to Market Economies: Comparison of European and Asian Experiences, S. Ichimura, T. 
Sato, and W. James (eds), Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009, pp. 37-66, at p. 41. 
4 Centeno, op. cit., p. 115. 
5 W. Brus, ‘Marketization and democratization: the Sino-Soviet divergence’, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 17 (4) (1993), pp. 433-444. 
6 R. Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
1998.  
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similar economic reforms, the pluralized Soviet regime was left completely 
paralysed. Detailed case studies of communist regimes on the ‘mono transition’ path 
(notably China and Vietnam) have shown how that strategy could reinforce one-
party rule by enabling the regime to capture new market spaces.7 Within the limits 
of one-party rule, these regimes have also gradually modified their political 
institutions (e.g. from monolithic to collective leadership, greater intra-party 
democracy, even local level elections with non-party candidates) to make them more 
compatible with the social changes brought about by marketization. These 
modifications facilitated the evolution of the regimes of China and Vietnam from 
‘early post-totalitarianism’ of the 1980s to the ‘maturing post-totalitarianism’ of the 
2000s.8 
North Korea’s divergence from the ‘mono transition’ pathway is apparent from 
its slower economic growth during the post-Cold War era. Though not fully reliable 
for socialist economies, data of estimated GDP growth (Table 1) provide at least a 
rough indicator of the extent to which North Korea has lagged behind not only China 
and Vietnam, but also Cuba (considered the most reluctant reformer of the three).  
 
Table 1 about here 
                                            
7 On Cuba, see J. Corrales, ‘The gatekeeper state: limited economic reforms and regime survival in 
Cuba, 1989-2002’, Latin American Research Review, 39 (2) (2004), pp. 35-65. On China, see S. 
Eaton, The Advance of the State in Contemporary China: State-Market Relations in the Reform Era, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015.  
8 S. Saxonberg, Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism: Regime Survival in China, 
Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 58-66 and 88-
103. 
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The pattern of growth appears to mirror the inconsistent economic reform pattern. 
Just three years after their official launch in 2002, reforms began to stall from 2005. 
Anti-marketization policies (2005-9) initiated a period of stagnation. The growth 
rate has remained sluggish during 2010-15 despite the return to market toleration 
from 2010 and succession by an ostensibly pro-reform leader in 2012. This suggests 
that reform efforts have been inadequate. Apart from the inconsistent reform pattern, 
North Korea is distinguished by its isolation from foreign direct investment (FDI), a 
staple ingredient of ‘mono transition’, owing to its proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD).9. 
 
Mainstream interpretation: political rigidity as the source of divergence 
 
Many leading authors attribute North Korea’s poor economic performance and the 
inconsistent economic reform pattern to the effects of its Monolithic Leadership 
System (MLS). Unlike the ‘mono transition’ regimes, North Korea has not 
experienced significant modification of the original Stalinist or ‘totalitarian’10 form 
of governance (i.e. concentration of political and economic power in the vanguard 
                                            
9 Here understood to mean nuclear weapons and sophisticated means for their delivery. 
10 The Stalinist type of regime (together with German fascism) belongs to the totalitarian regime 
type characterized by the existence of a monistic centre of power, exclusive ideology defined by the 
rulers, and mass mobilization for political and social tasks. See J.J. Linz, Totalitarian and 
Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2000, p. 70. 
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party under top-down leadership).11 Threatened by the post-Stalinist trend sweeping 
the Soviet Bloc after 1956, the Kim Il-Sŏng regime pursued an intensified form of 
Stalinism that culminated in the establishment of the MLS. Compared with classic 
Stalinism, the MLS elevated the status of Supreme Leader or suryŏng, to the extent 
of creating a high degree of personal power unmatched in the communist world.12 
Replacing the Marxism-Leninist formulation of the primacy of the vanguard party, 
‘Kimilsŏngism’ stressed the decisive importance of the Supreme Leader in 
advancing the cause of the revolution.13 Since the fate of the party, state, and even 
nation all depended on the Supreme Leader,14 obedience to and protection of the 
Supreme Leader became the highest duty for all party-state agencies and for each 
and every citizen. Identification with national salvation further elevated the status of 
the Supreme Leader. It bound national sovereignty (chuch’e)15 tightly to the Stalinist 
form of governance. The prevalence of such ‘national Stalinism’ forestalled the 
emergence of the more innovative forms of ‘national communism’ practised by the 
                                            
11 Brus characterized the system as ‘the amalgamation of strictly political with economic power’. 
See W. Brus, ‘Political pluralism and markets in communist systems’ in Pluralism in the Soviet 
Union: Essays in Honour of H. Gordon Skilling, S.G. Solomon (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke,1983, pp. 108-30. 
12 Wonjun Song and Joseph Wright, ‘The North Korean autocracy in comparative perspective’, 
Journal of East Asian Studies, 18 (2) (2018), pp. 157-80, at pp. 164-5. 
13 S.-C. Cheong, ‘Stalinism and KimIlsungism: a comparative analysis of ideology and power’, 
Asian Perspective, 24 (1) (2000), pp. 133-61 at pp. 146-51. 
14 K.-D. Lee, The Successor Theory of North Korea, Korea Institute of National Unification 
Studies Series 04-1, Seoul, 2004. 
15 Chuch’e (Juche) represents Kim Il-Sŏng’s brand of nationalism that was defined by national 
sovereignty; self-reliant economy; and self-reliance in defense. 
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regimes of Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam and Cuba,16 all of which would eventually 
follow the ‘mono-transition’ path. 
With the Supreme Leader deified as an indispensable social transformer and 
national saviour, the MLS developed into a system of ‘totalitarian patrimonial’ rule 
that combined Stalinist instruments of governance, nationalism and personal 
authority.17 In contrast to classic Stalinism, the personality cult of the Supreme 
Leader also extended to key members of his family (wife, son and ancestors). This 
justified hereditary succession, a feature unique to North Korea in the communist 
world. Hereditary succession would supposedly generate a successor of the same 
revolutionary pedigree as the Supreme Leader, enabling the revolutionary project to 
advance ‘from generation to generation’ (Lee 2004: 30-4). In practice, hereditary 
succession was designed ensure the stable transfer of power to a similar type of 
successor who would preserve the Supreme Leader’s legacy (and forestall the post-
Stalin and post-Mao experiences of policy revision). The extension of the 
personality cult to the Supreme Leader’s family enabled the regime to portray itself 
in a benign paternal manner (an image continuously reinforced by propaganda). This 
has led to characterizations of North Korea as a ‘corporate state’18 and as a ‘family 
state’. 19  The familial aspect was much stronger in North Korea than in other 
                                            
16 C. Chen, and J.-Y. Lee, ‘Making sense of North Korea: “national Stalinism” in comparative-
historical perspective’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40 (4) (2007), pp. 459-75. 
17 Saxonberg, op. cit., p. 119 
18 B. Cumings, ‘The corporate state in North Korea’, State and Society in Contemporary Korea, 
H. Koo (ed.), Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1993, pp. 197-230. 
19 B.-H. Chung and H. Kwon, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics, Rowman & Littlefield, 
Lanham, 2012. 
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communist regimes where a degree of familial influence also prevailed (notably 
Romania and Cuba).  
These ‘totalitarian patrimonial’ features would seem to make North Korea 
uniquely resistant to economic reform. By ensuring the stable transfer of power to a 
similar type of successor, hereditary succession also forestalled the political 
succession struggles that provided the impetus to economic reform in the USSR and 
China. The typical side-effects of reform (rise of non-state economic agents, dilution 
of loyalty by materialism, weakening of information control) that have challenged 
the mono transition regimes (notably China during the Tiananmen Crisis of 1989) 
have the potential to be fatal to North Korea’s ‘totalitarian patrimonial’ rulers. They 
stand to lose their personalized control over economic resources and they become 
vulnerable to the inflow of outside information (especially from rival South Korea) 
that may question the official accounts of their achievements, in effect, eroding both 
the material and subjective bases of their personality cults. It is not that North 
Korea’s rulers do not understand the benefits of economic reform, rather they are too 
risk-averse to implement reform in a decisive manner. Trapped in a ‘reform 
dilemma’, it is political risk aversion and traditional ideology that the ultimately 
prevails over half-hearted reformism.20 
Some studies have attempted to show how, over two decades, the political 
interests of the rulers thwarted the economic reforms needed to boost national 
welfare. In response to the famine of 1995-7 (‘arduous march’), the regime chose to 
safeguard food supplies for the military under the doctrine of ‘military first politics’ 
(sŏn’gun chŏngc’hi) than release them for popular consumption. The regime did not 
                                            
20 V.D. Cha, ‘The North Korea question’, Asian Survey, 56 (2) (2016), pp. 243-69, at p. 249. 
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draw on its financial reserves to import food but instead appealed for international 
aid. Those least politically prioritized were forced to fend through informal 
marketization, a process that was hindered by official criminalization of commercial 
activities and internal migration.21 Although the top-down reforms of 2002 were 
unprecedented by North Korean standards, they were actually motivated by the 
regime’s political impulse to tame and control the spontaneous market mechanisms 
unleashed by the famine. Alongside the devolution of authority and introduction of 
incentives, the regime was introducing monetary and financial measures to destroy 
private wealth (by price appreciation). In other words, pro-market measures were 
simultaneously being countered by anti-market ones.22 
The period of reform was also very brief. From late 2005, the regime attempted 
to restore the rationing system and then in 2008, it announced a restriction 
prohibiting participation in markets by those under the age of 40. This culminated in 
attempts in 2009 to turn general markets back into farmers’ markets. Later that year, 
the regime attempted to destroy accumulated private wealth by currency 
redenomination. Marketization was happening in spite of, and not because of, the 
regime.23 The ‘reforms’ of the current Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime are said to follow a 
                                            
21 S. Haggard and M. Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea, 
Petersen Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 2011, p. 86. 
22 Ibid. p. 121. 
23  S. Haggard and M. Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2007, p. 215; U.-C. Yang, ‘Reform without transition: the economic 
situation in North Korea since the July 1, 2002, measures’, North Korean Review, 6 (1) (2010), pp. 
71-87. 
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similar pattern of acknowledging the ‘facts on the ground’ that it cannot control24 
while avoiding fundamental market-enhancing reforms (e.g. legal safeguarding of 
private property rights, official marketization of the factors of production, genuine 
openness to FDI). One empirical study of the post-succession personnel structure of 
the current Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime suggests that the political economic pattern is 
continuing as before.25 Moreover, the frequent use of terror by Kim Chŏng-Ŭn 
would not appear to provide a stable environment for marketization. 
Unable to fully restore the state allocation system, the regime acquiesces to 
marketization to the extent necessary for its survival. Writing about the Former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Hellman observed how the winners of partial 
marketization constituted the biggest obstacles to comprehensive reform.26. Lacking 
democratic institutions of any sort and with state ownership still prevalent (hence I 
use the term ‘crony socialism’), North Korea arguably represents the most extreme 
example of this phenomenon. The core power agencies of the party-state monopolize 
the most lucrative foreign exchange activities (raw materials). To lock in their 
privileges, the regime and its chief stakeholders maintain the existing institutional 
environment. This enables them to stifle the emergence of competition from 
independent entrepreneurs.27 Denied access to the most lucrative opportunities, most 
                                            
24 M. Noland, ‘The elusive nature of North Korean reform’, Asia Pacific Issues: Analysis from the 
East-West Center, No. 108, 2013, 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/api108.pdf [accessed 4 February 2014] 
25 S. Haggard, L. Herman and J. Ryu, ‘Political change in North Korea: mapping the succession’, 
Asian Survey, 54 (4) (2014), pp. 773-800. 
26 J. Hellman, ‘Winner takes all: the politics of partial reform in post-communist transitions’, World 
Politics, 50 (2) (1998), pp. 203-34. 
27 Haggard and Noland (2007), op. cit., p. 217 
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non-state economic agents feed off the economic crumbs of marketization. This 
‘economic logic of autocracy’, means low growth, low productivity and continuing 
poverty for the majority.28 This is because export earnings (or ‘rent income’) are not 
reinvested into boosting productivity (e.g. investment into higher value 
manufacturing) but distributed according to political loyalty or consumed wastefully 
(e.g. construction of propaganda monuments or ski resorts). 29  North Korea’s 
external troublemaking is said to follow from domestic political and economic 
rigidity. To supplement its inadequate resources, the regime resorts to nuclear 
leverage in place of serious economic reform.30 Thus North Korean diplomats have 
constantly underlined their country’s difference from ‘mono transition’ regimes like 
China or Vietnam.31 
 
Alternative interpretation: economic flexibility despite political rigidity 
 
The alternative perspective is based on economic indicators suggestive of better 
performance. Supplied by Seoul’s Bank of Korea, standard GDP estimates have been 
                                            
28  H.-J. Park, ‘How has North Korea avoided collapse and reform/openness?’, Korea Focus, 
(2013a) 
http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/DEV/essays/view.asp?volume_id=139&content_id=104762&category
=G [accessed 15 January 2014] 
29 H.-J. Park, ‘Expanding North Korea-China economic cooperation and the future of the North 
Korean regime: a “rentier state” analysis’, KINU Online Series CO11-09 (2011), 
http://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/1870/1/0001447701.pdf [accessed 10 October 2011] 
30  For example, see J.D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International 
Security, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2010. 
31 Cha, op. cit., pp. 254-6. 
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criticized for neglecting the role of the informal economy.32 The inclusion of the 
service-oriented informal sector would probably add one or two points to the GDP 
growth rate.33 The rapid growth of trade since 2010 would also suggest a much 
higher rate of GDP growth. Total trade (including inter-Korean trade) grew from 
USD 5,093 million (2009) to USD 8,966 million (2015).34 The level of trade would 
suggest recovery of GDP to the pre-crisis levels (at the worst point of the famine in 
1997, it was USD 2,490 million).35 Analyses of North Korea’s own budget data 
show revenue growth to have constantly exceeded expenditure growth during the 
Kim Chŏng-Ŭn era.36 Using official budget data as the proxy for GDP growth, Frank 
calculated a robust 6.1 per cent growth rate (2016) and predicted a slower but 
                                            
32 The Bank of Korea’s centrally planned economy model estimates the service sector occupies 
only 30 per cent of the entire economy, of which two-thirds belongs to the state sector, leaving one 
third (or 10 per cent of the economy) for private service activities. See M.-S. Yang, ‘North Korea’s 
domestic economic policy and economic management improvement measures’, in 2015 DPRK 
Country Report, Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy & Management and Institute 
for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) (eds), KDI School and IFES, Seoul, 2015c, pp. 92-126, at pp. 104-5.  
33 M.-S. Yang, ‘The evaluation of 2015 and prospects for 2016: North Korean economy’, IFES 
Issues and Analysis, 2015a, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/FRM/FRM_0401L.aspx [accessed 5 
January 2016] 
34 National Statistics Office (NSO), Major Statistics Indicators of North Korea, NSO, Seoul, several 
issues. 
35 H. Feron, ‘Doom and gloom or economic boom? The myth of the “North Korean collapse”’, The 
Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 12:18 (3) (2014), http://apjjf.org/2014/12/18/Henri-
Feron/4113/article.html, [accessed 3 March 2015] 
36  R. Frank, ‘The 2016 North Korean budget report: 12 observations’, 38 North, 2016a 
http://38north.org/2016/04/rfrank040816/ [accessed 5 September 2016] 
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respectable 3.1 per cent for 2017 (probably owing to tighter Chinese sanctions)37 On 
the consumption front, international estimates of grain production revealed a four-
year upward trend (2010-11 to 2015-6) in domestic grain production that was 
approaching the pre-1990s crisis levels.38 The number of mobile phone subscribers, 
a telling indicator of consumerism, increased from 432,000 (2010) to 2.42 million 
(2013) to 3.24 million (2015) i.e. from 1.76 subscribers per 100 persons (2010) to 
12.88 per 100 (2015).39 
These indicators of economic improvement have coincided with the return to 
acquiescence with the market in the final years of the Kim Chŏng-Il regime (2010-
11) and the consolidation phase of the Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime (since 2012). 
Measures since 2012 suggest more than acquiescence with the market. Not long after 
Kim Chŏng-Ŭn assumed the top post of First Secretary of the ruling Korean 
Workers’ Party (KWP) (27 March 2012), he publicly pledged never to repeat the 
                                            
37 R. Frank, ‘The North Korean parliamentary session and budget report for 2017’, 38 North, 2017a, 
http://www.38north.org/2017/04/rfrank042817/ [accessed 8 May 2017] 
38 Against a minimal requirement of 5.5 million tons, the food balance (million tons) by marketing 
year (i.e. from November to October) was as follows: 5.04 (2010-11); 5.27 (2011-12); 5.73 (2012-
13); 5.93 (2013-14); 5.94 (2014-15). See FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) of the UN and 
World Food Programme (WFP), FAO-WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the 
DPRK: Special Report (23 November 2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf 
[accessed 15 January 2014]; FAO, ‘The DPRK: outlook for food supply and demand 2014/15 
(November/October)’, Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) Update on Food and 
Agriculture, (3 February 2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4363e.pdf [accessed 10 April 2016]; FAO, 
‘The DPRK: outlook for food supply and demand 2015/16 (November/October)’, GIEWS Update on 
Food and Agriculture, (27 April 2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5572e.pdf [accessed 9 July 2016]. 
39 NSO, op. cit.  
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austerity of the past (15 April 2012). ‘Marketization from above’ was restarted in 
June 2012 (‘June 28th Measures’) and followed by further measures in May 2014 
(‘May 30th Measures’). These micro-economic reforms sought to utilize the profit 
motive and local autonomy to boost the productivity of state-owned agriculture and 
light industry, key sectors serving the People’s Economy.40 While retaining formal 
state ownership, the measures opened up further opportunities for non-state agents 
(i.e. entrepreneurs, merchants and financiers). This ‘socialist management of our 
own style’ resembled Chinese ‘dual track’ reforms of the 1980s when the planned 
and market economies co-existed.41 Another aspect of ‘marketization from above’ 
was the opening up of new opportunities for non-state agents in key social 
infrastructural projects (especially housing) and consumption activities (e.g. retail 
and entertainment facilities). 
Explanations for the return of ‘marketization from above’ attribute this 
phenomenon to the combination of structural pressure and political calculus. At the 
structural level, the 1990s collapse of the formal economy necessitated spontaneous 
marketization at the grassroots (‘marketization from below’) and devolution of 
financial responsibility to the core party-state agencies themselves. As a result, the 
market activities of the people and the core agencies became entwined on many 
levels.42 Marketization became a major source of income for the core agencies (via 
                                            
40 It denotes the part of the economy controlled by the Cabinet and is responsible for supplying the 
ordinary citizens. 
41 K. Gray and J.-W. Lee, ‘Following in China’s footsteps? The political economy of North Korean 
reform’, The Pacific Review, 30 (1) (2017), pp. 51-73, at pp. 59-65.  
42  S.-H. Lim, The Rise of Markets within a Planned Economy, Samsung Economic Research 
Institute, Seoul, 2009; H.-M. Joo, ‘Visualising the invisible hands: the shadow economy in North 
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export monopolies) and greatly enriched their leaders. As a result, those non-state 
agents with invaluable skills and contacts also prospered as economic partners. 
Officials at all levels gave protection to market activities in order to supplement their 
inadequate state salaries. According to Suk-Jin Kim, most restrictions could be 
‘bypassed through bribery and punishments are not very severe’.43 As North Korea’s 
principal trading partner, Chinese economic entities have been a vital force in 
fuelling the trend of marketization by promoting for-profit transaction. 44  More 
fundamentally, Lee has argued that since 2013, the principal currencies of 
transaction have become the US dollar (and other hard currencies) and the dollar-
pegged North Korean won. Dollar-pegging means that regardless of whether 
economic activity is official (i.e. within the ‘planned’ sector) or informal, it is 
governed by a capitalist logic (of having to earn dollars or dollar-pegged won).45 
Against the background of structural pressure, political calculus helps to explain 
the variations in the marketization trend. Here, the foremost aspect would be the 
second hereditary succession. In 2008, North Korea faced great uncertainty both 
externally (hostile conservative administration in Seoul) and domestically as Kim 
Chŏng-Il’s health sharply deteriorated. To build a solid basis for the accelerated 
succession by his inexperienced youngest son Chŏng-Ŭn, Kim Chŏng-Il turned 
                                            
Korea’, Economy & Society, 39 (1) (2010), pp. 110-45; H. Smith, North Korea: Markets and Military 
Rule, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. 
43 S.-J. Kim, ‘North Korea’s economy under Kim Jong-Un: performance and outlook’, Vantage 
Point: Developments in North Korea, 38 (8) (2015b), pp. 10-14, at pp. 12-13. 
44 J. Reilly, ‘China’s market influence in North Korea’, Asian Survey, 54 (5) (2014), pp. 894-917. 
45 S. Lee, ‘Overview: growth, dollarization and the emergence of a dual economy’ in 2016: The 
DRPK Economic Outlook, S. Lee (ed.), Korea Development Institute, Sejong City, 2017, pp. 14-37, 
at pp. 22-30. 
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towards closer relations with China from 2009 (while ending the domestic anti-
marketization campaign in 2010). Switching its emphasis from aid to for-profit 
transactions, China pledged investment for ambitious infrastructural and production 
projects. Trade increased dramatically between 2010 and 2013. 46  In order to 
consolidate its power, the new leadership of Kim Chŏng-Ŭn built upon this 
momentum for marketization. As a third-generation successor, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn could 
not rely on bloodline inheritance to the same extent as his father (who spent decades 
moulding his public image). 47  By contrast, he had to build his legitimacy on 
performance in the economic sphere. In his first public speech (April 15th 2012) he 
pledged never to return to austerity:  
 
It is our party’s resolute determination to let our people who are the best in the world, 
our people who have overcome all obstacles and ordeals to uphold the party faithfully, 
not to tighten their belts again and enjoy the wealth and prosperity of socialism as much 
as they like48 
 
                                            
46 North Korean export figures to China (USD millions) were: 793 (2009); 1,188 (2010); 2,464 
(2011); 2,458 (2012); 2,914 (2013): 2,841 (2014); 2,484 (2015). Import figures (USD millions) were: 
1,888 (2009); 2,278 (2010); 3,165 (2011); 3,528 (2012); 3,633 (2013): 4,023 (2014); 3,226 (2015). 
See NSO, op. cit. 
47 R. Frank and P.H. Park, ‘From monolithic totalitarianism to collective authoritarian leadership? 
Performance-based legitimacy and power transfer in North Korea’, North Korean Review, 8 (2) 
(2012), pp. 32-49, at p. 43. 
48 http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/04/18/english-transcript-of-kim-jong-uns-speech/ [accessed 
15 May 2015] 
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Looking to preserve power over a 40 to 50-year timeframe, the 30-something Kim 
Chŏng-Ŭn has had to think more about comprehensive economic reform.49 Kim 
Chŏng-Il was reportedly involved in designing his son’s formulation of an economy-
based ruling strategy.50  
 
Delving further into the sources of economic reform: three contentious 
issues 
 
The alternative explanation invites further consideration of three contentious issues 
that represent the most common doubts about the advance of marketization in North 
Korea. First, how does the regime reconcile marketization with the interests of the 
‘core constituencies’ that depend on the unreformed economy? ‘Core constituencies’ 
consist of servicemen, 51  residents of the capital P’yŏngyang, 52  munitions and 
                                            
49 A. Lankov, ‘Kim Jong Deng: Why North Korea is choosing market reforms’. Carnegie Moscow 
Centre, 2015, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/59170 [accessed 12 January 2016] 
50 S.-C. Cheong, ‘An examination of the possibility of pushing ahead with a policy for reforms and 
an opening-up by the Kim Jong-Un regime’, Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea, 36 (2) 
(2013), pp. 48-57, at p. 50 
51 This denotes those in active military service (men aged 17-27) (inmingun changbyŏng) who 
also perform vital economic tasks (such as construction, disaster relief) designated by the state.  
52 Using data from North Korea’s 2008 (foreign-assisted) census, Suk Lee estimated a per capita 
income of USD 948-1,361, making North Korea one of the world’s poorest countries. P’yŏngyang, 
however, enjoyed a per capita income of USD 2,658-2,715. See S. Lee, ‘How high is North Korea’s 
real Employment and income?’, KDI Focus, No. 78, 2016, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888769 [accessed 4 may 2017] 
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strategic industry labourers, and middle and senior government and party officials.53 
Some scholars think that these relatively privileged sectors represent ‘the people’ 
that Kim Chŏng-Ŭn pledged to protect from austerity.54 The regime’s interest in 
perpetuating monolithic rule would not appear to be served by shaking up the 
inefficient remnants of planning and rationing that benefit these loyalists. For 
example, the regime appears determined to revive some of the inefficient heavy 
industries (e.g. synthetic fibre, steel) by modifying their operation, instead of 
focusing on light industry as South Korea had done during the 1960s.55 To some 
critics, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s ‘reforms’ resemble his father’s reluctant acquiescence 
rather than genuine enthusiasm for the market.56  
Some scholars have expressed doubts as to whether the current regime can free 
itself from the ‘military-first politics’ inherited from Kim Chŏng-Il. For example, 
the South Korean government branded Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s ‘line of parallel advance’ 
(i.e. nuclear-based defence with economic development) as the continuation of the 
failed military-biased policies of his grandfather and father, but given a nuclear 
                                            
53 M. Cho (2013), ‘The economic policies in North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong-Un’, 
Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea, 36 (5) (2013), pp. 48-57, at p. 55. 
54 For example, as of December 2008, core constituents could purchase rice at 45 won per kilo 
against a market price of 2000 won. See Y-H. Lee, ‘Changes in North Korean economic structure 
and prospects of reform and opening in the Kim Jong-Un era’, Vantage Point: Developments in North 
Korea, 37 (7) (2014), pp. 47-56, at p. 51. 
55 S.-J. Kim, ‘North Korea’s economy under Kim Jong-Un: performance and outlook’, Focus on 
Korean Peninsula 32 (2) (2015a), pp. 1-9, at p. 6. 
56 For example, Noland, op. cit., p. 4. 
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twist.57 From a formal theoretical perspective, Wintrobe described ‘military first 
politics’ as the ‘militarization of society’, a unique escape act that enabled the Kim 
Chŏng-Il regime to resort to military rule without incurring the normal trade-off 
between military and civilian loyalty. However, the insatiable military demand for 
resources will only make it more difficult for North Korea to carry out economic 
reforms in the footsteps of China or Vietnam.58 These factors lead some writers to 
predict a future of ‘simple reproduction’ (i.e. slow growth without qualitative 
change) than the continuous advance of marketization.59  
Second, the evidence of growth based on trade does not fully dispel the ‘crony 
socialism’ problem alluded to above. Critics have argued that ‘growth’ represents a 
superficial improvement based on the temporary increase of raw materials exports 
(especially coal and iron ore) to China since 2010. These are said to be classic ‘point 
source’ assets whose revenues can be easily captured by the state and channelled 
into showcase projects such as ski resorts, amusement parks and WMDs.60 However, 
the prospect of declining Chinese demand (in response to continuous nuclear 
provocations) is set to reduce North Korea’s foreign exchange receipts.61 
                                            
57 Ministry of Unification Understanding North Korea 2014, Institute for Unification Education, 
Seoul, 2014, p. 267. 
58 R. Wintrobe, ‘The logic of the North Korean dictatorship’, NEPS Working Paper Series 5/2-13, 
2013, http://www.europeanpeacescientists.org/5_2013.pdf [accessed 12 August 2014] 
59 For example, see Cho, op. cit. pp. 54-5 
60  For example, M. Noland, ‘Why is North Korea growing’, North Korea: Witness to 
Transformation, 2015, https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/why-north-korea-
growing [accessed 15 November 2015] 
61 K.-S. Lee, ‘Current trends and characteristics of the North Korean economy and its future outlook 
at the 70th anniversary of the founding of the WPK’, in 2016 DPRK Country Report, Korea 
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More fundamentally, the control of these lucrative raw material resources under 
the monolithic regime is based on the proximity to power rather than entrepreneurial 
skill. To build and maintain the system of monolithic rule, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s 
predecessors had allocated the most lucrative economic assets to the core party-state 
agencies, namely the military, Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and security agencies. 
Based on political patronage rather than entrepreneurship, this pattern of profit 
taking does not favour long-term investment and growth.62 Given that economic 
benefit is derived from power, the cronies have no incentive to promote market 
institutions that might nurture competitive entrepreneurship.63 On the contrary, they 
stand to benefit from crackdowns that restrict competition.64 Under this ‘economic 
logic of autocracy’,65 the economy remains trapped in low productivity raw material 
exports while the wealth gap widens in favour of the cronies.66 
                                            
Development Institute School of Public Management (ed.), KDI School, Seoul, 2015, pp. 117-44, at 
pp.121-30 
62 Haggard and Noland (2007), op. cit., pp. 190-1, 216-7 
63 For example, a 2007 survey of 250 Chinese firms operating in North Korea found that the North 
Korean state (via state-owned enterprises and state licensed-agents) monopolized the most profitable 
activities associated with Chinese trade and investment. See S. Haggard and M. Noland, ‘Networks, 
trust and trade: the micro-economics of China-North Korea relations’, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics Working Paper WP12-8, 2012, https://piie.com/publications/working-
papers/networks-trust-and-trade-microeconomics-china-north-korea-integration [accessed 15 March 
2013] 
64  M.-S. Yang, North Korea’s Planned Economy and Marketization, Institute for Unification 
Education, Seoul, 2015e, pp. 84-5. 
65 H.-J. Park (2013a) op. cit.  
66  Chang cites a survey of 500 defectors revealed that the highest to lowest income quintile 
distribution to be 45 times based on their private economic activities. The corresponding ratio for 
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As the dispenser of patronage, the Supreme Leader reinforces his own power and 
resources by encouraging competition among the core agencies. 67  The highly 
publicized purge of Kim Chŏng-Ŭn own uncle’s Chang Sŏng-T’aek (reputed 
number two of the regime) in 2013, illustrates the workings and excesses of this 
method of rule. Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s father had allowed Chang and his Administration 
Department of the KWP to acquire an ‘economic small kingdom’ in order to counter-
balance the privileged military and the Organization and Guidance Department of 
the KWP.68 While the immediate cause of Chang’s downfall was his lieutenants’ 
defiance of Kim Chŏng-Ŭn direct order (to surrender a fish farm), the economic 
background to the collective upsurge against him was his domination of the lucrative 
export of coal, cutting out other influential agencies and the even Supreme Leader.69 
After the purge, some of Chang’s assets were reportedly re-acquired by the military 
                                            
South Korea (2014) was 5.4 times. See Y.-S. Chang, ‘The evaluation of 2015 and prospects for 2016: 
North Korea’s domestic politics’, IFES Issues and Analysis No. 35 (2015-12), 2015, 
http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/FRM/FRM_0401V.aspx?code=FRM151215_0001 [accessed 18 
January 2016] 
67 Y.-J. Park, ‘Informal political system in North Korea: systematic corruption of “power-wealth 
symbiosis”’, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 24 (1) (2016b), pp. 123-56, at p. 
147-8. 
68 H.-J. Park, ‘The ups and downs of the military’s influence in the period of Kim Jong-Un’s power 
consolidation (2009-2013)’, KINU Online Series CO13-23, 2013b, 
https://www.facebook.com/KINU1991eng/ [accessed 22 December 2013] 
69 K.E. Gause, ‘North Korean political dynamics of the Kim Jong-un era’, International Journal of 
Korean Unification Studies, 25 (1) (2016), pp. 33-63, at p. 51. 
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while others went to Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s own economic office.70 This episode suggests 
that despite claims of reform, ‘crony socialism’ has not been replaced with a more 
rational allocation of foreign exchange assets. 
Third, how does marketization advance in the presence of a regime committed to 
monolithic rule? Spontaneous marketization has weakened the regime’s surveillance 
capacities71 and even sparked unorganized political dissent.72 Although the current 
regime has not attempted to reverse marketization, ambivalence persists. For 
example, in his address to the Seventh Party Congress in 2016, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn 
repudiated ‘reform and openness’, the slogan associated with China’s ‘mono 
transition’ path: 
 
Despite the filthy wind of ‘reform and openness’ blowing in our neighbourhood, we let 
the spirit of military-first rifles fly and advanced according to the path of socialism that 
we had chosen.73 
 
                                            
70 Y.-J. Park, ‘One year after the execution of Jang Sung-Taek: the shifts of power and privilege in 
North Korea’, KINU Online Series CO14-17, 2014, pp. 9-10, 
https://www.facebook.com/KINU1991eng/ [accessed 12 October 2014] 
71 A. Lankov and I.-O. Kwak, ‘The decline of the North Korean surveillance state’, North Korean 
Review, 7 (2) (2011), pp. 6-21. 
72  H.-M. Joo, ‘Hidden transcripts in marketplaces: politicized discourses in the North Korean 
shadow economy’, The Pacific Review, 27 (1) (2014), pp. 49-71 
73 R. Frank, ‘The 7th party congress in North Korea: an analysis of Kim Jong-Un’s report’, The 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 14 (4) (2016b), p. 5, http://apjjf.org/2016/14/Frank.html 
[accessed 22 May 2016] 
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Monolithic rule is not conducive to the development of market supporting 
institutions, especially property rights based on the rule of law. 74  The political 
environment remains inhospitable to entrepreneurship. For example, surveys of 
defectors found that party members did not engage in commerce directly but instead 
preferred to use their power to extract rents. Thus, the merchant class came 
predominantly from the middle and lower classes rather than those with the best 
class backgrounds or sŏngbun (‘composition’) (i.e. history of family service to the 
regime).75 This behavior would suggest that enterprise exists in spite of the regime 
and not because of it. For Smith76 and Choi,77 the violent purges of the Kim Chŏng-
Ŭn era are symptomatic not of monolithic rule but of divided elites fighting over 
market opportunities. In their view, this vicious high politics demonstrates that 
marketization is well entrenched. Need and greed have supplanted the hegemonic 
(i.e. consent-based) dimension that previously underpinned monolithic rule. 
However, this type of zero-sum environment of political contestation would not 
appear to be conducive to the development of market institutions either. 
 
                                            
74 Noland (2015), op. cit. 
75 B.-R. Kim, ‘Marketization of North Korea and changes in the social class structure’, IFES Focus 
on Korean Peninsula, 30 (4) (2015), 
http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/common/popup/PUB_Contents.aspx?code=PRI150313_0001 
[accessed 8 December 2015] 
76 H. Smith, ‘North Korea: intra-elite conflict and the relevance for global security’, PacNet 41, 
2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-41-north-korea-intra-elite-conflict-and-relevance-
global-security [accessed 6 June 2017] 
77 Y.-S. Choi, ‘North Korea’s hegemonic rule and its collapse’, The Pacific Review, 30 (5) (2017), 
pp. 783-800. 
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Framework for re-examining the sources of economic reform 
 
The three contentious issues above represent the most common doubts about the 
reform commitment of the North Korean regime despite the recent announcements 
of reform and positive economic signals. I will show how the sources of economic 
reform (structural factors and political calculus) identified above have enabled these 
constraints to marketization to be overcome. This can be represented as in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 illustrates the effects of both structural trends and political calculus. As for 
the regime’s dependence on its core constituencies, the structural legacy of failed 
planning and economic collapse has forced the majority of core constituents to 
depend on the market to some degree. Another structural factor is the nature of the 
MLS itself. As a system that maximizes the authority of the Supreme Leader, it gives 
him great autonomy to redefine the economic ideology in market terms. In terms of 
political calculus, the political consolidation of the new regime depends on funds, 
for which the market and rebalanced expenditure (‘parallel advance’) represent the 
obvious sources. The rebalance is reflected in the tighter leash on the military, 
including curtailing of some of its foreign exchange privileges. 
In relation to ‘crony socialism’, the monopolies and oligopolies dominated by 
core agencies can only function on the basis of cooperation with non-state agents 
(who possess the requisite funds and skills). This need brings about wealth sharing 
and wealth creation as well as bureaucratic profit-taking. Structural interdependence 
was reinforced by political calculus, which led the Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime to 
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introduce micro-economic measures (in agriculture and light industry) based on 
profit-motive and expanded opportunities for non-state agents. The purges related to 
foreign exchange assets represent efforts by the centre (Kim Chŏng-Ŭn) to 
strengthen its control over the finances of the core agencies while cooperative 
relationships with non-state agents remained intact.  
As for the constraint posed by monolithic rule, mutual dependence and repeated 
interaction is leading to the emergence of a ‘symbiosis’ between core agencies and 
non-state agents. Policy reversal has become increasingly difficult. The regime’s 
politically motivated drive to boost consumption further reinforces mutual 
dependence. For example, the regime seeks private support to deliver in politically 
prioritized areas such as housing. Finally, by improving the official finances, 
marketization enables the regime to pursue ‘civilized country with socialism’ as an 
alternative to regime modification experienced under the ‘mono transition regimes’. 
We can now explore each of these issues in more detail.  
 
Marketization and the ‘core constituencies’ 
 
By the time Kim Chŏng-Ŭn assumed power in 2012, the ‘core constituencies’ had 
already been exposed to two decades of crisis-induced marketization. First permitted 
by the Kim Il-Sŏng regime in the 1980s, informal market activities gained 
momentum as the termination of Soviet and Chinese ‘friendship prices’ (1990-91) 
brought the official economy to the edge of collapse. When three consecutive years 
of bad weather (1995-7) tipped the country into famine (so-called ‘arduous march’), 
the Kim Chŏng-Il regime drastically streamlined the central planning process. Apart 
from some ‘special enterprises’ (e.g. defence-related and heavy industries) and 
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infrastructure (especially power generation), central government devolved economic 
responsibility down to local level administration, enterprises and farms to provide 
for their own production and consumption needs. While some sections of ‘core 
constituencies’ (especially workers of ‘special enterprises’) could rely on state 
provision to a greater degree, most economic units and individuals came to rely on 
informal market activities to some degree. 78  The informal sector became the 
principal provider for people’s livelihoods by 2000, a telling indicator of exposure 
to marketization.79 
This background of structurally driven marketization was reinforced by the 
political motivations of the new Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime. As mentioned above, Kim 
Chŏng-Ŭn could not rely on bloodline inheritance to the same extent as his father 
and had to build his own performance-based legitimacy.80 As a hereditary successor, 
he identified with his father’s practical achievements, especially nuclear 
development and preservation of the North Korean state despite the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc. On the other hand, he was seeking to distance himself from economic 
hardship, the most unpopular feature of his father’s ‘military first’ era. To distance 
himself from his father’s unpopular legacies while establishing his own identity, he 
looked to economic development. While he did not think it wise to repudiate his 
father’s security legacy, he also sought to rebalance the regime’s priorities. His first 
public speech of 15 April 2012, when he pledged that austerity would never be 
                                            
78 M.-S. Yang (2015e), op. cit., pp. 26-7, 98-9. 
79 The informal sector constituted ‘almost 60 per cent of staple food grains and 70 per cent of 
necessities in the mid-1990s’. See Lim (2009), op. cit., p. 11.  
80 Frank and Park, op. cit., p. 43. 
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repeated (acknowledging the pain that austerity had brought), was an early indicator 
that consumption (People’s Economy) would receive greater priority.  
The pattern of policy announcements and appointments following the 15 April 
speech suggested the emergence of a reform pathway designed to enhance the core 
sectors’ reliance on the market. On 28 June 2012, the authorities announced the 
introduction of ‘New Economic Management System in Our Own Style’. These 6-
28 Measures, as they became known, outlined policies for giving greater autonomy 
to the agricultural and light industrial sectors (core sectors of the People’s Economy). 
The policies resembled the early stage of China’s ‘reform and openness’, even 
though North Korea never embraced that slogan. In contrast to the aftermath of the 
7-1 reforms of 2002, the 6-28 Measures were reinforced by the further measures of 
30 May 2014. Under these 5-30 Measures, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn referred to the ‘socialist 
corporate responsibility system’.81 The switch towards economic reform was also 
apparent from the reappointment of Pak Pong-Ju to the position of Prime Minister 
(April 1st 2013). As one of the architects of the 2002-5 cycle of reform, Pak had 
served as premier during 2003-7. He was one of the ‘Big Four’ technocrats who led 
the 2002-5 reforms. At the Seventh Party Congress of May 2016, Pak was further 
                                            
81 M.-S. Yang, ‘North Korea’s marketization in the Kim Jong-Un era’, IFES Focus on Korean 
Peninsula, 32 (2) (2015d), pp. 49-57, at p. 53, 
http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/PUB/PUB_0501V.aspx?code=PRI150901_0001 [accessed 22 
November 2015] 
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promoted to the five-member Presidium (equivalent to China’s Standing 
Committee) of the Politburo and also to the KWP’s Central Military Committee.82 
Any serious attempt to rebalance towards popular consumption meant shifting 
resources away from the military sector, both in terms of reduced central defence 
expenditure and reassignment of foreign exchange assets devolved to the military 
under Kim Chŏng-Il’s ‘military first’ policy. Following on from his 15 April speech, 
Kim Chŏng-Ŭn gave further hints of this rebalance. For example, in a meeting with 
senior officials in mid-June 2012, Kim had reportedly said ‘food grain is more 
important than bullets today’. 83  Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s pattern of public activities 
between 2012 and 2015 revealed a shift towards a greater emphasis on economic 
rather than military goals.84 The rebalancing was officially acknowledged by the 
announcement of the doctrine of pyŏngjin nosŏn or ‘line of parallel advance’ (i.e. 
between nuclear-based defence and economy) in April 2013. ‘Parallel advance’ was 
a term first used by national founder Kim Il-Sŏng half a century earlier. This marked 
a modification of the Kim Chŏng-Il regime’s emphasis on ‘military first’.85 Of 
course, lip service continued to be paid to the achievements of ‘military first’. 
                                            
82 Y.-J. Park, ‘Assessment and prospect of the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea: 
leadership system and elite group’, KINU Online Series, CO16-13, 2016a, 
https://www.facebook.com/KINU1991eng/ [accessed 22 May 2016] 
83 Cheong (2013), op. cit., p. 52. 
84 The balance (per cent) between economy and military was as follows: 24.5/32.5 (2012); 34.0/29.7 
(2013); 36.0/32.5 (2014); and 44.9/30.2 (2015). See Y.-S. Jeon, ‘The WPK’s 70th anniversary and 
strengthening of the party’s political control’, in 2016 DPRK Country Report, Korea Development 
Institute School of Public Management (ed.), KDI School, Seoul, 2015, pp. 18-54, at. p. 40. 
85 D.-Y. Kim, 2015), ‘70th anniversary of the founding of the WPK and North Korea’s military 
dilemma’, in KDI School (ed.), op. cit., pp. 56-85.  
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Marking the announcement of ‘parallel advance’, the headline of the KWP 
newspaper, Rodong Sinmun (5 April 2013) quoted from Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s speech: 
 
The most important and desperate task facing our party today is pressing the 
development of an economically powerful country and dramatically improving the lives 
of the people.86 
 
In reality, Kim Il-Sŏng’s ‘parallel advance’ initiated several decades of military 
build-up and austerity. The use of the slogan in the 2010s was designed to connote 
continuity and association with the optimistic early 1960s but the content 
represented a shift away from military-bias. One year before the announcement of 
‘parallel advance’ in April 2013 and the reappointment of Pak Pong-Ju as premier, 
some tentative changes were already occurring in this direction. The first sign of 
change came in April 2012 when the Cabinet, the part of the regime responsible for 
the People’s Economy, was designated as the ‘economic headquarters’. Kim Chŏng-
Ŭn reportedly said: 
 
We must establish discipline and order in a way to concentrate all economic problems in 
the Cabinet and solve them under its command should we make a revolutionary turn in 
improving the standard of people’s living and turning the country into an economic 
power.87 
 
                                            
86 Ibid. p. 61 
87 Cheong (2013), op. cit., p. 53. 
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Despite being a new leader, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn appeared to have the political authority 
as well as the political incentive to initiate ‘marketization from above’. To begin 
with, he occupied the position of Supreme Leader within the MLS. While it has been 
criticized for inhibiting economic reform, the MLS also invested the Supreme 
Leader with a high degree of autonomy to redefine the official ideology as he saw 
fit. The only absolute principle was total allegiance to the Supreme Leader and his 
prevailing orders. This had enabled Kim Chŏng-Il to dismantle much of the elaborate 
central planning system created by his father and justify the move towards ‘self-
responsibility’. Similarly, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn also had leeway to redefine what 
constituted ‘socialism’ and the sacred official principle of chuch’e (‘national 
autonomy’).  
As a share of the government budget, military expenditure has been officially 
(under) stated as either 15.8 per cent (2009-12, 2016) or 15.9 per cent (2014 and 
2015).88 However, it is possible to identify tentative shifts away from military bias 
in other ways. One significant development was the transfer of military rights for 
most foreign currency projects (except for arms exports) to the Cabinet. This was a 
response to the military’s corruption and inflexibility as the leading economic 
institution.89 The military Chief-of-Staff, Vice Marshal Ri Yŏng-Ho, was dismissed 
in July 2012, ostensibly for opposing this transfer. Ri’s dismissal was the 
culmination of a longer process of reallocating economic authority. In February 
2012, a ‘party life guidance group’ was dispatched to military units with the aim of 
uncovering the abuse of authority, including activities related to foreign exchange. 
Foreign currency factions and clans underwent disciplinary measures with many 
                                            
88 Frank (2016a), op. cit. 
89 Cheong (2013), op. cit., p. 53 
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senior officers being replaced. The military’s wartime rice reserves were released for 
state ration, thereby contributing to the stabilization of market prices in 2013.90 In 
this respect, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn has been more successful than his father.91 The annual 
number of soldiers mobilized for economic tasks also doubled under Kim Chŏng-
Ŭn, to about 200,000.92 
The transfer of foreign exchange rights and the dismissal of Vice Marshal Ri 
constituted a part of a wider process of reining in the military that had been 
empowered under Kim Chŏng-Il. Since 2012, the military has been subject to change 
by purge, reshuffle, new appointments and intensified KWP supervision. As the new 
Supreme Commander, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn promoted another 23 general-rank officers in 
February 2012.93 By the end of 2012, the regime had removed not only Vice Marshal 
Ri but also the other three top military officers who had accompanied the hearse at 
Kim Chŏng-Il’s funeral in December 2011.94 The defense minister changed six times 
                                            
90 H.-J. Park (2013b), op. cit., p. 3. 
91 The ill-fated currency redenomination of 2009-10 was ostensibly aimed at curbing the military’s 
foreign currency activities but the military sabotaged the initiative by failing to release rice reserves 
to support the rationing system and stabilize prices. See H.-J. Park, ‘Kim Jong Il, the military and the 
party, and Kim Jong Un’, KINU Online Series CO10-12, 2010, 
https://www.facebook.com/KINU1991eng/ [accessed 4 January 2011] 
92 I am grateful to Dr Seong-Chang Cheong for this observation (Discussion, 14 April 2016). 
93 Preceding this, Kim Chŏng-Il promoted 185 military officers to the rank of general or gave them 
an extra star during 2010-11 to ensure the senior military’s loyalty to his successor. See K.-D. Lee, 
S.-H. Lim, J.-H. Cho and J.-H. Song, Study on the Power Elite of the Kim Jong Un Regime, Korea 
Institute of National Unification, Study Series 13-01, Seoul, 2013, pp. 57-8. 
94 A. Mansourov, ‘Kim Jong Un’s first 100 days: consolidating power and clearing political space 
for national revival’, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 22 (1) (2013), pp. 81-108, 
at p. 90. 
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between 2013 and 2015. One (Hyŏn Yŏng-Ch’ŏl) was executed in April 2015 for 
‘militarism-based bureaucracy’ or putting professionalism over politics and for 
showing irreverence towards Kim Chŏng-Ŭn. This showed that no measure of 
disobedience would be tolerated. The General Political Bureau that supervised the 
military for the KWP was strengthened and placed under the leadership of party 
professional Choe Ryŏng-Hae (now accorded the highest military rank of Vice 
Marshal).95 
 
‘Crony socialism’: wealth sharing and wealth creation 
 
‘Crony socialism’ began in 1974 when heir-apparent Kim Chŏng-Il began to 
reassign trading companies from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to Office 39, a newly 
created KWP financial unit. This enabled the Kims to divert foreign exchange from 
the official People’s Economy into the hereditary succession project. 96  The 
‘patrimonial’ economy became more pronounced as the official economy 
deteriorated in the early 1990s. In 1991, the regime created the New Trading System 
that set foreign exchange targets for all core agencies. Different branches of the same 
agency established their own trading companies, a trend replicated at the local 
level. 97  During the famine, these core agencies were given control of foreign 
                                            
95 S.-C. Cheong, ‘Purge of Hyon Yong-Chol and outlook on party-army relations in North Korea’, 
Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea, 38 (7) (2015), pp. 10-15, at pp. 12-15. 
96 H.-J. Park and S. Choi, Fiscal Segmentation and Economic Changes in North Korea, Korea 
Institute for National Unification, Study Series 14-05, Seoul, 2014, p. 14. 
97 Ibid. pp. 36-7 
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exchange assets in order to support themselves and to contribute to central funds.98 
Kim Chŏng-Il himself would allocate the trading licences or wakku99 required for 
participation in foreign exchange activities. Core agencies (usually operating 
through a trading company) would make a business proposal and seek Kim’s 
approval. If approved, the proposals would become ‘party directives’.100 Prioritised 
under ‘military first’, the military came to dominate cash generators like raw 
materials, fisheries, mushrooms and ginseng.101 
‘Crony socialism’ thus appears to concentrate wealth among the rapacious elites 
instead of creating new wealth. This would coincide with estimates of stagnant GDP. 
However, this perspective overlooks the extent of financial power accrued by non-
state agents as a result of ‘marketization from below’ since the 1990s. The 
entrepreneurship that sprang up in response to the failure of state planning also 
penetrated into the state sector. Kim and Yang identified two types of private 
entrepreneur. 102  ‘Necessity driven” entrepreneurs were motivated by difficult 
circumstances and confined their activities largely to private farming and 
handicrafts. The more ambitious ‘opportunity driven’ entrepreneurs were those 
whose activities reached into the state sector by way of investment and 
                                            
98 Ibid. p. 43 
99 Wak or Wakku (와꾸) is a form of North Korean slang (meaning ‘trade license’) not used in the 
South.  
100 Yang (2015e), op. cit., pp. 29-30. 
101 J.-J. Suh, Economic Hardship and Regime Sustainability in North Korea, Korea Institute for 
National Unification, Studies Series 08-06, Seoul, 2008, pp. 21-2. 
102 S.-J. Kim and M.-S. Yang (2015), The Growth of the Informal Economy in North Korea, Korea 
Institute of National Unification, Studies Series 15-02, Seoul, p. 21. 
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management.103 From this group sprang the private financiers or tonju (literally 
meaning ‘owner of money’) or the new rich who had amassed an average of one 
million US dollars, a huge sum by North Korean standards.104 They have become 
important economic partners of the state. 
Mutually profitable relationships existed at many levels. At the most basic level, 
private entrepreneurs would obtain official permission to start businesses using state 
assets. For example, individuals would rent space from the state to open up a service 
business or to use as storage space. To do this, they would borrow titles from state 
agencies and enterprises for a fee.105 This ‘name lending’ or ‘wearing the red hat’ 
resembled the Chinese “registration” (guahao) system of the 1980s. A more 
ambitious form of cooperation was ‘loan investment’ whereby tonju would invest 
into SOEs in return for interest (profit). Because they lacked money, state entities 
(factories, stores, trading companies, and even banks) would turn to tonju for loans, 
investments and outsourcing of contract processing.106 For SOEs facing government 
production quotas (i.e. those key plants within the official economy) without 
receiving the necessary inputs, they had to turn to tonju for finance.107 
Given its power, the military made the most attractive institutional patron for 
aspiring entrepreneurs.108 But even for that powerful core agency, the relationship 
ran both ways. To profit from its control of assets, it had to cooperate with civilians. 
                                            
103 Ibid.  
104 Y.-J. Park (2016b), op. cit., p. 140. 
105 Yang (2015e), op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
106 Ibid. p. 61. 
107 Kim and Yang, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
108 Y.-J. Park, (2016b), op. cit., pp. 143-4. 
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Despite having enormous manpower, it relied on support from sub-contract civilian 
labour. 109  Sub-contract labour consisted of under-employed workers from the 
People’s Economy who retained their formal work registration out of political 
requirement. Like other state agencies, the military needed investment and 
entrepreneurial skills. In this way, the core agencies and entrepreneurs (especially 
tonju) became interdependent. To maintain their authorization or wakku, the core 
agencies would be expected to contribute to the centre’s ‘revolutionary funds’.110 By 
extension, the Supreme Leader also came to depend on business cooperation with 
non-state agents. Despite reversion to anti-marketization from late 2005, the Kim 
Chŏng-Il regime continued to facilitate private investment into key export sectors. 
For example, the ‘Regulations for the Development and Operation of Small and 
Medium Sized Mines’ (2006) allowed any agency or business organization to 
develop and operate mines independently once they had received state 
authorization.111 Yang has usefully summarized the symbiotic relationships in the 
export sector as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The above discussion has established that in order to prosper, the core agencies 
need the cooperation of informal business partners and informal workers, with 
                                            
109 Suh, op. cit., pp. 21-2. 
110 Park and Choi, op. cit., pp. 45-6; M.-S. Yang, ‘Measures for improving economic management 
under Kim Jong-Un’s leadership and their assessment: 2012-14’, Vantage Point: Developments in 
North Korea, 38 (6) (2015b), pp. 38-49, at p. 33. 
111 Kim and Yang, op. cit., p. 23. 
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whom profits would be shared. The question remains as to whether ‘crony socialism’ 
allows for qualitative change (towards higher value-added production) or does it 
remain trapped in low productivity raw material exports? The profile of exports to 
China, the principal market for these ‘point source’ assets112 points to qualitative 
change rather than stagnation. While raw materials remained the dominant export, 
other exports are also significant. For example, manufacturing export based on 
textiles (a typical export of early stage developing economies) accounts for a 
significant share. As a share exports to China, textiles accounted for USD 108 
million (21.6 per cent) (2005), USD 186.4 million (15.7 per cent) (2010), USD 587 
million (20.1 per cent) (2013), and USD 799.3 million (32.2 per cent) (2015).113 
The introduction of reforms aimed at resuscitating the productivity of the 
People’s Economy also differentiates North Korea from typical crony political 
economies based on primary resource extraction. Facing competition from the 
informal markets, the cautious Kim Chŏng-Il regime had already started to do this 
with the 7-1 measures (2002). Two such policies were the ‘earned income indicator’ 
and ‘socialist barter markets’. The ‘earned income indicator’ was introduced to 
evaluate enterprise performance on the basis of quality over quantity. It allowed for 
autonomous production and distribution. ‘Socialist barter markets’ enabled 
enterprises to exchange raw materials and parts. They permitted enterprises to 
exchange a certain ratio of products for materials.114 The fundamental problem of 
the 7-1 measures was that they introduced incentives (higher wages, higher prices, 
                                            
112 As described by Noland, op. cit., 2015. 
113 NSO, op. cit. ‘Textiles’ consists of ‘apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted’ (code 
61) and ‘apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted’ (code 62).  
114 Yang (2015e), op. cit., pp. 54-5 
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more enterprise and farm autonomy etc.) without first normalizing production (i.e. 
restoring productive capacity nearer to pre-crisis levels). Thus, they were more akin 
to efficiency measures for a sluggish planned economy than recovery measures for 
a broken one. 
The Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime has moved further in the direction of reforms aimed 
at improving the productivity of the People’s Economy. Under the 6-28 (2012) and 
5-30 (2014) measures, further incentives were introduced in agriculture and light 
industry, the sectors responsible for the people’s consumption. Table 3 compares the 
2002-5 and (on-going) 2012-15 reform periods.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The 2002 reforms showed that without first investing to normalize production, 
incentives could not take effect. The official sector continued to be unattractive to 
workers, as evidenced by their continued drift into the informal sector. In response 
to the need for ‘pre-investment’, the current government has been more flexible in 
its economic ideology. While retaining formal state ownership, the government has 
allowed for greater use of private funds. This has enabled private financiers to invest 
into state-run companies while receiving interest in return. 115  Alternatively, 
individual entrepreneurs can lease state facilities and hire workers using their own 
funds. Provincial governments have also received permission to solicit investment 
                                            
115 E.-C. Lim, ‘The formation and development of private financing in North Korea: patterns, 
implications and challenges’, Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea, 38 (10) (2015a), pp. 31-
43, at p. 35 
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from private sources.116 These examples of private participation in state owned 
industry show how the state is licensing capitalist activity so long as it remains under 
nominal state ownership.  
This section has argued that while ‘crony socialism’ undoubtedly exists, the most 
powerful cronies (the core power agencies) can only profit from their dominance of 
foreign exchange assets through input (of money and talent) from non-state agents. 
This results in profit sharing between core agencies and non-state agents. This 
pattern of cooperation persists irrespective of changes in ownership brought about 
by elite conflict. The growth of trade (with growing volume and composition of 
manufactures) and the spread of consumerism would suggest that new wealth is 
being created under ‘crony socialism’, and that it is confined not only to the elites. 
In respect of wealth creation, the measures taken by Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime to boost 
the productivity (6-28 and 5-30 measures) of the People’s Economy have expanded 
the opportunity for non-state agents to an unprecedented degree. The emphases on 
rebuilding People’s Economy, bolstering the authority of the Cabinet, and 
reconstruction of infrastructure (especially power generation) indicates that Kim 
Chŏng-Ŭn is able to set clear priorities for the investment of state resources. As such, 
his authority appears to be getting stronger rather than being eroded by infighting 
among elite factions. 
 
Sustainability of marketization under monolithic rule 
 
                                            
116 S.-K. Lee, ‘The economic policy for the Kim Jong-Un regime in North Korea and the possibility 
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How sustainable is marketization in the presence of monolithic rule? I will argue 
that increasing cooperation between state agencies and informal capitalists has 
created links of interdependence that have become very costly for the regime to 
rupture. Moreover, the regime has no political necessity to rupture these links 
because it faces no prospective threat from its entrepreneurial allies. The failure of 
market-reversal during 2005-9 showed how the regime was already tightly locked 
into market cooperation with non-state agents. Market reversal policy brought about 
the very social instability that the regime feared. The capacity of major merchants 
and financiers to withstand anti-market measures, including currency reform, 
showed how deeply entrenched marketization had become.117 The ill-fated anti-
market policies of 2005-9 arose because the Kim Chŏng-Il regime had reluctantly 
introduced reforms without modifying its economic ideology. By contrast, the 
current regime has officially committed itself to boosting popular consumption and 
Kim Chŏng-Ŭn has personally endorsed the profit motive. Whereas Kim Chŏng-Il 
(26 August 2007) denounced the market as, ‘the habitat of anti-socialism’118 Kim 
Chŏng-Ŭn, referring to agricultural reform reportedly stated that: 
 
                                            
117 By the end of the Kim Chŏng-Il era, the ‘merchant class’ (i.e. those who traded as an occupation) 
was estimated to number between 500,000 and one million individuals (out of a population of 25 
million), a significant pointer to the existence of grassroots capitalism. See Y.-S. Dong, ‘The rise of 
North Korea’s merchant class’, SERI Quarterly, October 2013, pp. 67-72, at pp. 67-8. 
http://www.seriworld.org/16/qt_Section_list.html?mncd=0301&dep=1 [accessed 10 November 
2013] 
118 H.-J. Park (2010), op. cit., p. 3. 
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egalitarianism in the realm of distribution has no connection to socialist principles and 
has a detrimental impact that reduces farmers’ productivity119 
 
The regime’s growing acceptance of marketization is manifested in the official 
tolerance of informal property rights under the veneer of state ownership. Although 
formal ‘property rights’ still do not exist, private property has developed into a 
‘social custom’120 i.e. something that is widely accepted in practice. According to 
refugees, the three main items of ‘property rights’ are small land plots, market stands 
and housing.121 The first two items of individual private property also emerged in 
the early stages of reform socialism in China and Vietnam (i.e. low value assets that 
could easily be reconciled with state socialism). The penetration of property rights 
into the real estate (housing) sector, however, represents a significant advance. It 
represents the regime’s de facto acceptance of private ownership, usage and transfer 
of a high value asset so long as the appropriate taxes are paid (see below). In the 
past, the government would have allocated such a valuable asset according to 
sŏngbun or one’s (political) make-up. Now it is primarily concerned with obtaining 
revenue. 
The range of ‘concealed property rights’ or private property under state guise is 
expanding. Private ownership of the means of production is permitted if it is 
incorporated into a state organization.122 Many forms of de facto private ownership 
                                            
119 Vantage Point, ‘North Korea’s attempts for agricultural reform’, Vantage Point: Developments 
in North Korea, 37 (4) (2014), pp. 26-9, at p. 27. 
120 S.-J. Kim (2015a), op. cit., pp. 6-7 
121 Ministry of Unification, op. cit., p. 220. 
122 M.-S. Yang (2015a), op. cit.  
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of productive facilities now exist. First, individuals can engage in cottage industries 
(family-sized manufacturing activities), private cultivation and private commerce. 
Second, individuals can manage a business using a state-run enterprise name 
(‘wearing the red hat’), using leased state facilities while hiring workers with their 
own money (in effect, a labour market). Third, recently it was confirmed that in 2014 
the government revised the law to permit rich individuals or tonju to invest in 
businesses. According to the Article 38 of the new law: 
 
Following the established procedures, the enterprises can get a loan from the bank or 
mobilize and use the idle currency and funds in the hands of the people [my italics] to 
overcome the lack of working capital.  
 
This is the first confirmation that the authorities have provided a legal basis for the 
use of informal savings.123 The attitude of the authorities appears to be pragmatic, 
namely, maintaining the appearance of state ownership while relaxing the substance 
for the sake of reviving production and collecting tax revenue. In effect, the informal 
capitalists can treat state-owned assets as if they are private assets. At the very least, 
their ‘property rights’ are secure enough for them to sink money and effort into state 
enterprises. 
Apart from tolerating capitalist activity, the regime is actively soliciting non-state 
participation in the key projects designed to showcase official concern for popular 
                                            
123 IFES (Institute for Far Eastern Studies), ‘North Korea revises business law to legalize private 
investments’, NK Brief 06-2, 2017a, 
http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/frm/FRM_0101V.aspx?code=FRM170613_0001 [accessed 29 July 
2017] 
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welfare. The non-state sector is playing a key role in the apartment construction 
boom in P’yŏngyang and other cities. A ‘construction alliance’ consisting of central 
government, core government agencies, financiers, and construction service 
providers has emerged in the process. As with trade, most apartment construction 
begins with core agencies seeking official licenses. Having obtained licenses, they 
then contract out to builders (often through brokers) capable of mobilizing funds, 
materials and manpower. It is estimated that private contractors are responsible for 
80 per cent of apartment construction in North Korea and that one-third of new 
apartments are traded on the market (i.e. those not directly allocated by the 
government).124 Trading of apartments has become a very lucrative business. The 
asking price of new apartments reportedly ranges from USD 100,000 for a 
downtown 100m2 apartment to USD 200,000 for the most expensive apartment 
located in the upmarket Pot’onggang district.125 Given the original purchase price 
was probably USD 30-40,000, this meant very high profit margins for those with 
cash to invest in purchase and re-modelling for resale. Since the apartments are 
included in the state construction plan, the private sector is playing a central role in 
fulfilling the regime’s ambitious apartment construction programme associated with 
the rise of Kim Chŏng-Ŭn.126 The market for apartments shows that the non-state 
                                            
124 M. Hong, ‘The apartment construction market and urban politics in North Korea’, Vantage 
Point: Developments in North Korea, 37 (10) (2014), pp. 33-42, at p. 38. 
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agents feel secure enough to risk sizeable amounts of capital in a long-term venture 
like construction. 
Apart from the real estate market, the state is actively facilitating popular 
consumption (especially in P’yŏngyang) in order to build political support and 
collect tax. Towards these objectives, it has facilitated non-state agents and become 
a provider in its own right. The reorganization of ‘farmers’ markets’ into ‘general 
markets’ (2003) expanded the range of products for open sale and created an 
important source of official revenue.127 During the 2010s, this system has developed 
further. Department stores, general markets, restaurants, and entertainment facilities 
have proliferated in P’yŏngyang and the surrounding areas.128 By 2015, 26 public 
markets existed in P’yŏngyang, covering all districts, compared to just one in the 
early 1990s. 129  Frequent visitors have noticed the development of a thriving 
Chinese-style facility at the state-owned Kwangbok Area Shopping Centre.130 Since 
2012, three types of state electronic payment cards have been introduced for cash-
free payment at foreign exchange shops. Easily acquired, these cards speed up 
                                            
127  Y.-S. Chang and E.-M. Jeong, Double-Sidedness of North Korea, Institute of Unification 
Education, Seoul, 2015, pp. 78-9. 
128 Ibid. p. 90. 
129 E.-L. Joung, ‘North Korea’s economic policy as a duet with control and relaxation: dynamics 
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Journal of Asian Public Policy, 9 (1) (2016), pp. 75-94, at p. 92. 
130 For example, see R. Frank, ‘Witnessing change in North Korea: a view from the ground’, Global 
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purchases and help increase the total volume of financial transactions.131 Outside of 
P’yŏngyang, the ‘state dollar collection system’ also exists. One manifestation is the 
rental fee levied by the state on vendors at market squares.132 
What do these developments tell us? First, the authorities have become 
increasingly confident of living with marketization and consumerism (including the 
development of a mobile telephone network), even if it continues to suppress some 
manifestations (such as South Korean DVDs). Second, by providing consumer 
products and services previously neglected by the state, the informal sector has also 
opened up tax opportunities for the state (via the ‘state-dollar collection system’). 
These activities are simultaneously meeting popular demand and contributing to the 
finances of the state. South Korean estimates of the North Korean government 
budget (which tend to under-estimate) suggest continuous recovery (2009-15) 
despite international sanctions. The estimates are (billion USD): 3.7 (2009); 5.2 
(2010); 5.8 (2011); 6.2 (2012); 6.8 (2013); 7.1 (2014); and 6.9 (2015).133 Third, 
under the influence of the informal sector (and China), state agents themselves are 
becoming ‘entrepreneurial’, capable of profitably supplying products and services 
of increasing sophistication, including credit cards. The improvements concentrated 
in P’yŏngyang appear to be spreading out to the rest of the country. It would seem 
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the regime is tackling the incentive problem at the heart of state socialism’s 
economic malaise. 
The Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime appears to enjoy a cosy and productive relationship 
with the nascent capitalists (merchants, entrepreneurs and financiers). Far from 
posing a political challenge, these nascent capitalists depend on political 
patronage.134 Given that the assets from which they extract profit remain under state 
ownership, continuing access depends on maintaining smooth collaboration with the 
core agencies. In particular, the most profitable activities (e.g. export of raw 
materials, real estate and construction) depend on collaboration with those core 
agencies (especially party, military, security) that have most licensing authority. 
Without the regime, these nascent capitalists would lose their market space to foreign 
capitalists. Not only are they locked into interdependence with the regime, they are 
too divided (by social background, business size and source of bureaucratic support) 
to form the basis of any ‘civil society’ capable of confronting the state.135 For its 
part, the regime seems to recognize the nascent capitalists to be safe economic 
partners. The purges arising from elite conflicts over foreign exchange distribution 
affect the leaders of the core agencies rather than their informal capitalist partners. 
The latter’s access to state protection usually remains unchanged.  
Historically the transition towards ‘mature post-totalitarianism’ (characterized by 
increased consumerism, limited political liberalization, and the modification of 
political institutions) was accompanied by de-legitimization of traditional 
communist values. Regimes instead governed on the basis of ‘pragmatic 
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acceptance’ 136  or ‘social contract’. China and Vietnam have shown how 
marketization can provide resources for ruling regimes to renew themselves 
materially (greater capacity for party supervision) and ideologically (promotion of 
new social values consistent with one-party rule such as nationalism).137 In this way, 
they have avoided the fatal ideological de-legitimization suffered by the Soviet bloc 
regimes. The North Korean regime has been even more determined than its Asian 
counterparts to pre-empt the problems of de-legitimization associated with 
marketization. Economically, its position resembles the early ‘post-totalitarian’ stage 
in which the regime has decisively endorsed marketization. In the political sense, 
however, North Korea remains very much ‘totalitarian’. Marketization, however, has 
not been accompanied by a political thaw or by the dilution of monolithic rule based 
on the Supreme Leader. By contrast, intensification of the Kim Chŏng-Ŭn 
personality cult, the frequency of terror-based purges, and revived leadership role of 
the KWP since 2010 (as the military’s political role has been de-emphasized) serve 
to demarcate the rigid political sphere from the liberalizing economic one.  
This demarcation is also happening in a more sophisticated way. Far from ‘post-
totalitarian’ modification of the regime in response to marketization, marketization 
is utilized to reinforce the monolithic regime’s legitimacy (led by the revived KWP). 
While Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s economy-focus appears to be very much attuned to the 
                                            
136 Saxonberg, op. cit., pp. 288-9. 
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material aspirations of those in their 30s (i.e. his generation),138 his rule is not simply 
based on ‘social contract’. There is renewed emphasis on ideology. For example, 
Kim Chŏng-Ŭn has emphasised the achievement of ‘civilized country with socialism’ 
since 2013. Aimed particularly at youth, ‘civilized country with socialism’ seeks to 
bind the ‘market generation’ to the regime.139 It means boosting social satisfaction 
by investment of the fruits of economic development into collective benefits (e.g. 
extension of compulsory education, provision of recreational, housing and retail 
facilities, improvement of medical provision, development of sporting prowess). 
Naturally, these collective benefits of growth have been accompanied by parallel 
ideological efforts to extol the achievements of the ruling Kim dynasty.140 In this 
way, individual consumerism would be balanced by government efforts to nurture 
pride in the state and loyalty towards the Supreme Leader. Moreover, the nature of 
the MLS is such that the Supreme Leader has great flexibility in interpreting policy. 
As such, the regime is less bound by commitment to specific economic principles 
                                            
138 This is the view of former Minister of Unification Lee Jong-Seok. See B.-Y. Hwang and H.-
K. An, ‘Kim Jong-Un’s objective is Chinese-style rapid growth … his father’s testament: former 
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(such as egalitarianism or central planning). So far, there appears to be no 
contradiction between marketization and the absence of liberalizing political change. 
Even those commentators who have doubted the regime’s capacity for reform 
concede that the regime may have hit upon a viable formula for preserving power.141 
 
Conclusion 
 
Improved economic indicators and economic policy trends during the 2010s lend 
support to the alternative perspective that North Korea is becoming more 
economically flexible despite its adherence to monolithic rule. This perspective 
identifies structural forces (the momentum of twenty years of spontaneous 
marketization) and political calculus (especially regime consolidation following the 
second hereditary succession) as the driving forces of economic flexibility. This 
article delved further into three contentious issues often raised in critical response to 
the alternative perspective. First, it found a subtle but distinctive change in the 
regime’s leitmotif in the direction of economic development (from ‘military first’ to 
‘parallel advance’). An indication of this change was the attempt to curb the 
privileges and power of the military, the ultimate ‘core constituency’. Second, it 
found that the economic dangers of ‘crony socialism’ are balanced by the core 
agencies’ interdependence with non-state agents (especially financiers) who are also 
enjoying more market opportunities owing to official emphasis on boosting popular 
consumption. Third, regarding the compatibility of marketization with renewed 
                                            
141 For example, S. Haggard, ‘Kim Jong Un: a new ruling formula?’, North Korea: Witness to 
Transformation, 2015, https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/kim-jong-un-new-
ruling-formula [accessed 11 November 2015] 
 ADVANCE OF MARKETIZATION IN NORTH 
KOREA   
49 
monolithic rule, the current regime appears more habituated to marketization than 
its predecessor (e.g. Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s positive evaluation of profit, extension of 
informal property rights, non-state agents’ participation in key state projects and 
state entrepreneurship in the consumer sectors). In contrast to modification of 
political institutions under ‘mono transition’, the North Korean regime appears 
confident that it can reconcile individual prosperity with monolithic politics 
(‘civilized country with socialism’). 
The favourable marketization trends identified above are subject to external 
conditions not deteriorating further. ‘Parallel advance’ (simultaneous promotion of 
nuclear defence and economic development) has enabled the regime to rebalance its 
priorities between military and economy but ensures that North Korea continues to 
face international isolation, setting it apart from the other ‘mono transition’ regimes. 
While North Korea’s leaders can take some comfort from the continuation of 
economic growth amid international sanctions, the tightening of sanctions has 
inevitably undermined the economy’s growth potential. It appears that the North 
Korean leadership has come to appreciate this dilemma. In the spring of 2018, it 
initiated peaceful overtures that led to three summits each with China and South 
Korea and one with the US (as of October 2018), all of which resulted in hopeful 
statements of agreement. Underpinning this diplomacy was Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s 
announcement of the road of ‘economy-first’ in place of ‘parallel advance’ (March 
2018). Having seen authoritarian regimes deposed around the world, however, North 
Korea will consent to denuclearization only on the basis of ironclad security and 
economic guarantees.  
The reduction of tension and continued advance of marketization will be greatly 
facilitated by the hopeful diplomatic developments of 2018, the most important 
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aspect of which is the readiness of the US to engage with North Korea. Only this can 
ease the security obsession driving North Korea’s WMD development. In practice, 
this should mean the improvement of diplomatic and economic relations between 
the US and North Korea in exchange for a moratorium on WMD testing followed 
by verifiable denuclearization measures. While it is the most important aspect of 
engagement, it is also the aspect most vulnerable to derailment, especially on the US 
side. This arises out of the ability and willingness of the current Trump 
administration to stay the diplomatic course in view of the manifold disputes (e.g. 
with China over trade, with its domestic opponents over everything) in which it is 
embroiled. Moreover, President Trump’s lack of liberal-democratic idealism, which 
has so far facilitated direct engagement with North Korea, is well out of sync with 
the foreign policy sentiments prevalent in both major US political parties. Here, the 
continuing diplomatic efforts of China and South Korea work in the positive 
direction of bringing P’yŏngyang and Washington together.142 The hopeful trends of 
marketization identified in this paper will only be sustained if they are aligned with 
a peaceful external environment. 
 
Acknowledgements 
Research and writing of this article were kindly supported by the Academy of 
Korean Studies Grant AKS-2015-R21. I benefited greatly from my discussions 
                                            
142 On the objectives of the regional stakeholders, see J. Hemmings, R. Pacheco Pardo and T.Y. 
Kong, Negotiating the Peace: Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula, Henry Jackson Society, 
London, 2018, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327670448_Negotiating_the_Peace_Diplomacy_on_the_
Korean_Peninsula [accessed 12 September 2018] 
 ADVANCE OF MARKETIZATION IN NORTH 
KOREA   
51 
with many specialists especially Seong-Chang Cheong, Nam-Hoon Cho, Ruediger 
Frank, Dong-Ho Jo, Hyung-Min Joo, Byeong-Yeon Kim, Dong-Yub Kim, Suk Lee, 
Chung-In Moon, Hyeong-Jung Park and Hazel Smith. Hyo-Won Yoon and Eunmee 
Kim have always been welcoming and supportive during my frequent research 
trips to Korea. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful comments and the editorial team of Modern Asian Studies for their support. 
This article is dedicated to the memory of my sister Maisie (江詠頤) (1965-2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
